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Coqpelled Self-Reporting and the
PrinEiple Against CompeTled
self-$AcrimLation:some Compara
Perskectives
I

Mark ~erger'

b

Oliver H. ean Peer Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

~ a l l a d a ;Comparative law; Compulsory disclosure; Privilege against selfincriminafion;Right to fair trial; United States

The article examines the tension between mandatory self-reporting and identification
statutes bnd the right to befree of compelled self-incrimination. The author reviews decisions
addressing this issue taken by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), the Privy
Council, and the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States. He then analyses
applicab e public polices and assesses the alternative approaches available to accommodate
these coliflicting interests.

1
1

The modhrn twenty-first century state is characterised by a wide array of regulatory
requiremknts that cover both criminal and non-criminal public policy concerns. In
order to make certain that the regulatory process functions properly, public officials
have an opvious need to obtain information that covers both the identity and activities
regulated. However, despite the state's legitimate interest in securing
regulatory information, some techniques for achieving this objective
legitimate individual interests.
One method frequently employed to obtain needed identification and regulatory
data is torequire that the individual affected by the state's civil or criminal regulatory
system sdbmit the information himself. Indeed, compelled self-reporting has become a
common technique that is widely used due to its simplicity and efficiency. But while
compelleb self-reporting may not involve the physical intrusiveness of a seizure .to
obtain a &odily sample for DNA identification analysis, the essential character of the
procedure presents a very real risk that it will conflict with the right to silence and the
right to be free of compelled self-incrimination.
The pdtential conflict between compelled self-reporting and the principle that an
individual should not be forced by the state to contribute to his own conviction has
in fact arisen in a number of traffic enforcement cases decided by courts in differing

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance he received from personnel at the ECtHR
during his stay at the Court as a Visiting Scholar in March 2005. Financial assistance for the
research conducted at the Court was provided by the University of Missouri Research Board.
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2 6 Compelled Self-Reportingand the Principle Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
jurisdictions. The setting, in one form or another, has involved the imposition of an
obligation to report involvement in a traffic offence or road accident in circumstances
where the reporting individual may well have committed a traffic law violation. There
are also examples of statutes that require self-reporting to aid authorities in general
criminal investigations. Unquestionably, the self-reporting requirement (is a useful
device to obtain information and thereby further important regulatory idterests, but
the obligation to self-report also represents the exercise of state power (o force the
production of information from an individual who may be incriminated by both the
submission and contents of his report.
To date, no single solution has emerged to resolve the tension betweeri compelled
self-reporting statutes and the interests represented by the right to silen e and selfincrimination privilege. This is not surprising given the differing chara teristics of
the multitude of legal systems in which compelled self-reporting systemls are used.
However, the court decisions that have thus far addressed the problem illuktrate some
of the ways the conflict can be analysed along with the policy implications of the
1
alternative approaches.

f
I

Compelled self-reporting at the European Court of Human Rights

1

51

Although the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR) does ot include
explicit language creating a right to silence or self-incriminationprivilege, t European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR) has found that these principles are im licit in the
right to a "fair and public hearing" contained in Art.6(1) ECHR. The Euro ean Court
has described them as "recognised international standards which lie at ti e heart of
the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6",' and has observed that thej right to be
a criminal
free of compelled self-incrimination "presupposes that the prosecution
case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to eviden e obtained
through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the'f ac~used".~
Nevertheless, in the development of the principle against compelled self-inckimination,
the Court has not clearly explained how it would apply to the core conflkt between
mandatory self-reporting requirements and the right to be free from state ompulsion
to provide self-incriminatory evidence.
Legislation incorporating a compelled self-reporting system was recen ly at issue
. ~ setting was an Austrian statute th t required
before the ECtHR in Weh v A ~ s t r i aThe
the registered owner of a vehicle to identify the person who had driven or pa ked the car
at an identified date and time. For domestic law purposes, the statute concl ded with a
statement that the "authority's right to require such information shall take
over the right to refuse to give informati~n".~
Weh was directed to identify the driver of his car at a time when it was
exceeded the speed limit. He responded by providing the name of an

4

i

1

d

Murray v United Kingdom (1996)22 E.H.R.R.29 at [45].
Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 313 at [68].
(2004) 40 E.H.R.R. 37.
Austrian Motor Vehicles Act, s.103(2),as amended in 1986, cited in Weh, ibid.,
of impermissibly compelling self-incrimination.
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address $e identified as "USA/University of T e ~ a s " .The
~ Austrian courts concluded
that this esponse did not comply with the statutory requirements and imposed a penal
order an fine. However, there was no prosecution for any speeding offence connected
with We Is vehicle. A comparable set of facts was presented in Reig v AustriaI7 with
the Aust ian courts similarly imposing punishment for what it concluded was an
inadequ e response to the demand for driver identification information, and with Reig
also not eing subjected to prosecution for the underlying traffic offence.
Specia features of Weh and Reig make it difficult to describe clearly the ECtHR's view
of comp led self-reporting statutes. As the Court observed in both cases, prosecution
was insti uted by Austrian authorities for failing to provide complete information in
response o the statutory demand rather than for refusing to respond at all. Even though
, ~could be
the Cour labelled this issue as not being a "decisive element in i t ~ e l f " it
viewed a an outcome determinative factor. One can easily conceive of a system that
permits an individual to claim that a reporting obligation compels self-incrimination
while dedying him the option of responding with a false or incomplete ~tatement.~
Beyond that, no claim of personal compelled self-incrimination was ever made in
either ~ $ orh Reig. To the contrary, in each case the registered owner of the vehicle
asserted, whether truthfully or not, that the car had been driven by someone else at
the time !he traffic offence was committed. The claim that they were being forced to
provide tbe state with evidence that could be used to convict them of a criminal offence
was thus hn abstract argument directed toward the legitimacy of the statute as a whole,
not an in ividual assertion that the interests and objectives behind the right to silence
were dir ctly implicated in the information production demands presented to them.
Nevertheless, there is much in the ECtHR's treatment of the self-incrimination issue
to suggedt that it did not view the Austrian statute as inconsistent with Art.b(l) ECHR.
Initially, fhe opinion reaffirmed that "the right to silence and the right not to incriminate
oneself are not absolute".1° Then, in determining whether those rights were violated
in the pryceedings under the Austrian statute, the Court emphasised that no speeding
charges were filed against the complainants, nor were any anticipated, nor was the
compelled information used to secure a conviction based upon what the information
disclosed}From the Court's perspective, the applicantswere not "substantially affected"

1

1
,

1
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Weh, ibid., at [13].
No.63207/00), judgment of March 24,2005.
Weh, fn.4 above, at [55].
. Even if an inquiry is conducted by impermissibly compelling self-incrimination, the state
nevertheless has an interest in barring pejury because lying is morally unacceptable and because
it may mi$lead investigators. It has thus been argued that the state may limit the individual's
response ip cases of compulsion seeking self-incriminatory information to claiming the right to
silence or moving to bar the use of any information obtained as a result of the compulsion. There
is also arguable justification for limiting the exclusive response to claiming the right to silence
since the ebtclusion of compelled evidence may ultimately make it difficult for the state to secure
a convictidn. Peter Westen and Stewart Mandell, "To Talk, to Balk, or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth
Amendment Doctrine of the 'Preferred Response' " (1982) 19 American Criminal Law Review 521,
pp.528-533.
lo Weh, fn.4 above, at [46]. Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 12 at [47], and
Murray, fn.2 above, at [47],were cited in support of this observation.
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28 Compelled Self-Reporting and the Principle Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
so as to be considered charged with an offence for purposes of ~rt.b(l),lland the
obligation to name the driver of the car was a simple fact that the Court did not believe
was in itself incriminating.12
Compelled self-reporting was also involved in the ECtHR's ruling in Vasileva v
~ e n n z a r k That
. ~ ~ case concerned the detention of a bus passenger who was alleged
to have travelled on a bus without purchasing a valid ticket. She refusedlto identify
herself and was held by the authorities under a Danish law providing that "[elvery
person has a duty to disclose his name, address, and date of birth to the police upon
request. Failure to do so is punishable with a fine.'114The Court's judgment assessed the
validity of the detention under Art.5 ECHR by balancing the state interest in securing
the immediate fulfilment of the disclosure obligation against the individual interest
in the right to liberty. However, the legitimacy of the obligation to self-identify did
not trouble the Court. It clearly implied that the obligation was a valid requirement,
observing that "it is a fundamental condition for the police in order to carry out
their tasks, and thus ensure law enforcement, that they can establish the' identity of
citizens".15
The Privy Council and the balancing of interests
In Brown v stott,16 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered a Scottish
statute that required that the keeper of a motor vehicle identify its driver when that
driver was alleged to have committed a covered offence. The statute made it a crime
to fail to provide the identification information, thereby establishing the kompulsion
necessary under the self-incrimination privilege. Additionally, the statute was applied
to a suspect who was asked to identify the driver of her car under circumstances clearly
suggesting that she was intoxicated and would incriminate herself if she stated that
she was the vehicle's operator. Nevertheless, the suspect answered the qhestion and
admitted to having driven the vehicle. She was ultimately charged with driving a car
after consuming excessive alcohol, and the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could
rely on her admission in making his case.
The Scottish High Court of Justiciary reached the conclusion that the use of the
suspect's admission obtained pursuant to the compelled production statute violated
Art.6(1) ECHR.'~As Lord Bingham noted in his Privy Council judgment,'the Scottish
Court had viewed the right to resist compelled self-incrimination ad applicable
Weh, fn.4 above, at [54]. The right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination are
limited to criminal proceedings and investigations, including those who are chhrged with a
criminal offence as well as those considered "substantially affected" by the dctions of the
authorities within the meaning of the Convention. Serves v France (1999) 26 E.H.R.R. 265 at [42].
l2 Weh, fn.4 above, at [54].
l3 (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 27.
l4 ibid., at [20].
I
l5 ibid., at [39]. Vasileva was cited by the Court ~ I Weh
I
as illustrating the fact that reporting
obligations are a "common feature" of the legal systems of Convention signatozies. Weh, fn.4
above, at [45].
I
l6 [2003] 1A.C. 681.
I
l7 Brown v Stott [200Cl] S.L.T. 379.
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munication that would contribute to proving an offence, whether the
made at trial or out of court. It had also found nothing in the
offence or in the difficulty of proving a violation that justified
principle assuring individuals freedom from compelled self-

viewed the ECHR as establishing a more fluid human
of the Art.b(l) fair hearing requirement. Since the
duty does not explicitly include protection against
not be treated as an unyielding right as long as
hearing standard. Lord Bingham found support
that had rejected the argument that protection
the Convention was absolute.18 Opinions
of the Eurbpean Commission on Human Rights were also cited as proof of the flexible
character f the Convention's self-incrimination principle.19
In detefining whether the Scottish statute offended Art.b(l), Lord Bingham found
it approp iate to weigh the individual's interest in freedom from compelled selfincriminagon against the state's interest in securing compelled admissions and using
them to oqtain a criminal conviction. In that balancing process, emphasis was placed on
the need to regulate the use of motor vehicles because of the high incidence of death and
injury they produce. Pursuing that interest through a compelled disclosure requirement
was viewpd as a proportionate response to the problem, and the use of the compelled
admissioq at trial did not undermine the right to a fair hearing. Lord Bingham appeared
satisfied lqy the fact that the only disclosure called for was the identity of the vehicle
operator, and noted that the penalty for non-compliance was a moderate fine without
any custodial confinement. The state was thus pursuing a legitimate aim, and doing so
in a reasohable manner.
North ~ d e r i c a napproaches

d

The Supr me Courts of both Canada and the United States have addressed compelled
self-identiecationstatutes against the background of their unique legal environments. In
R. v White 20 the Canadian Supreme Court considered a self-incrimination challenge to
legislatio creating a statutory obligation to stop and report involvement in a vehicular
accident. he defendant claimed that admission at trial of any statement made pursuant
to the statyte would constitute a violation of s.7 of the Canadian Charter which prohibits
any depriQation of the "right to life, liberty and security of the person . . . except in
accordanc~with the principles of fundamental justice".21

4

Reference was made both to Murray, fn.2 above, and Condron v United Kingdom (2001) 31
E.H.R.R. 1.
l9 The European Commission rulings cited were DN v Netherlands (App. No. 6170/73) 1975;JP,
KR and G H v Austria (App. Nos 15135/89,15136/89 and 15137/89) decision of September 5,1989;
and Tora Tolmos v Spain (App. No.23816/94) 1995. In each, claims that reporting requirements
violated the ECHR were rejected.
[I9991 2 S.C.R. 417.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.7.
Is

*'
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30 Compelled Self-Reportingand the Principle Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
The American Supreme Court has dealt with compelled self-identification legislation
,~~
Court considered a Fifth Amendment selfon two occasions. In California v ~ y e r sthe
incrimination challenge to a statute similar to the Canadian vehicular stop and report
~~
law
legislation. More recently, in Hiibel v Sixth Judicial District Court of ~ e v a d aa,Nevada
requiring that anyone lawfully stopped by the police identify himself when requested
to do so was attacked on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. The decisions of
the Canadian and American Supreme Courts adopted differing approaches in applying
the right to freedom from compelled self-incrimination to the challenged~legislation.
The Canadian ruling grew out of a car accident that resulted in a fatality. The
driver who caused the death left the scene, but later called the authorities to repprt her
involvement. In her subsequent prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident, the trial
but the prosecution
judge found that the driver made the report under compulsion~4
proposed to prove the offence by relying in part upon the driver's compelled admission
of involvement. This, however, was viewed as inconsistent with the pripciple against
self-incrimination recognised in numerous Canadian decisions as a tenet of fundamental
justice. But while the tension between admitting the compelled report at trial and the
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination was evident, Canadian law had
not previously treated the self-incrimination principle as an absolute right. The Court
instead described the protection as "contextually-sensitive",25 and noted that it was
obligated under the Charter to balance any principle of fundamental justih, such as the
self-incrimination privilege, against other individual and societal i n t e r e ~ t g . ~ ~
Applying that analysis, the Court recognised that the compelled replort contained
relevant information that would be of assistance to the trier of fact in any prosecution for
leaving the scene of an accident. However, from the perspective of the d~iverinvolved
in a car accident, the act of engaging in the regulated activity of driving 1s not entirely
voluntary given the realities of contemporary life. The Court further cbnsidered the
relationship between the driver and public authorities at the time of the filing of the
report to be adversarial in nature, and recognised that the setting was one'that involved
both an incentive for the driver to provide false information and for the 1olice to abuse
their authority in obtaining the driver's statement. These considerations led the Court to
conclude that despite the evidentiary value of the compelled self-identidcation report,
its use in a criminal prosecution would constitute a violation of the Chart~r.
As a solution to the problem the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the btatute would
have to be interpreted to provide immunity against the use of the conipelled report
in any criminal prosecution. The state's interest in immediately obtainink information
22 402

I
U.S. 424 (1971).
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
" The Canadian Supreme Court accepted the conclusion that the driver's rkport had been
compelled: [I9991 2 S.C.R. 417, at [lo], [90], [93]. However, the dissent observed {hat the finding
of the trial judge that the report was compelled by the statute was inconsistent ith the further
observation that the statements made by the driver in the report were free and oluntary: ibid.,
at [I101 (L'Heureux-Dube J., dissenting). The analysis in the majority opinion, owever, rested
on the determination that a finding that the report was compelled was suffici nt to raise the
self-incrimination issue.
25 ibid.,at [45].
26 ibid., at [47].
I
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I

relevant t the enforcement of non-criminal vehicular regulations would thereby be
accomrnoqated, while at the same time the individual interest in not being compelled
to providq' the state with information for use in a criminal prosecution would be
respected.q7 Prosecution of the individual providing the report would still be possible,
but informgtion compelled from the accused could not be used in that process.
In Byersl the US Supreme Court reached a conclusion on the self-incrimination
consequentes of a mandatory stop and report statute opposite from that of the Canadian
Supreme Court in White. In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger for four members of
the Court, ithe self-identification obligation was measured against the American Fifth
Amendmeht prohibition that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness Against himself". Despite the very specific and apparently absolutist character
of the Amkrican self-incrimination privilege, in contrast to the generalised Canadian
fundamental justice and ECHR fair hearing standards, the Court's plurality opinion
concluded,thatthe tension between the competing state and individual interests had to
be resolved through a balancing process.28This, in turn, produced the conclusion for the
plurality t$at the stop and identify statute was not inconsistent with Fifth Amendment
requireme ts.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasised that the stop and identify statute was
primarily himed at the satisfaction of civil liability claims arising from motor vehicle
accidents, 'not at providing a method to facilitate criminal convictions. This served
to distinguish the legislation from prior American cases in which laws requiring selfreporting by gamblers29and gun owners;O as well as statutes mandating the registration
of members of Communist organ is at ion^,^^ were held to violate the privilege against selfincrimination. Those were seen as reporting obligations applied to a "highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities" where the background was "an area
permeated, with criminal statutes", rather than being part of an environment that was
"an essentblly noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry".32
Supplerentlng its balancing analysis, the plurality also concluded that the act of
stopping after a traffic accident was not a testimonial communication of the sort barred
by the ~ i e r i c a nself-incrimination privilege. To the contrary, it was characterised as
more akin to requiring an individual to appear in a police line-up or give a blood sample,
both of wpch the Court had held to be outside the scope of the Fifth A ~ n e n d m e n t . ~ ~
Even the obligation for the driver to disclose his name and address did not implicate
self-incrimination concerns, the Court characterising this duty as "an essentially neutral
act".34 Neither the fact that compliance with the statute might lead to a prosecution
that would not have occurred had the driver fled the scene, nor the possibility that the
triPr of fact might infer that the individual who stopped was the driver of a vehicle

"I

P

I

ibid., d t [71].
Byers,ifn.22 above, p.427.
29 Marchetti v United States 390 U.S. 39 (1968);Grosso v United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
30 Haynes v United States 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
31 ~ l b e r t s o nv SACB 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
32 Byers, fn.22above, p.430, citing Marchetti, fn.29 above, p.47 and Albertson, fn.31 above, p.79.
33 United States v Wade 388 U.S. 218 (1967);Schmerber v California 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
34 Byers, fn.22 above, p.432.
27
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involved in an accident was sufficient to convert the statute into a system compelling
the production of testimonially communicative evidence.35
The US Supreme Court's most recent self-reporting decision extended the principle
that such statutes do not offend the self-incrimination privilege to a general duty of selfidentification. In Hiibel, the Court confronted a self-incrimination challenge to a Nevada
statute requiring that anyone lawfully stopped by the police on reasonable suspicion
must identify themselves to the authorities on request. As in Byers, the Supreme Court
found no Fifth Amendment ~ i o l a t i o n . ~ ~
Unlike the plurality in Byers, the Hiibel majority declined to rule on the claim that
the statutory disclosures were not testimonial. Instead, the majority concluded that the
defendant had not demonstrated a reasonable danger of incrimination aris' g out of the
statutory self-identification requirement. The opinion expressed the belief t, at Hiibel's
refusal to identify himself was not based on a fear of self-incrimination, but rather was
due to his claim that "his name was none of the officer's business".37 Beyopd that, the
Court noted that in criminal cases, "it is known and must be known who has been
arrested and who is being tried".38 However, if it could be shown in a particular case
that the furnishing of identity information would provide the police with "g link in the
chain of evidence needed to c~nvict"?~
the Court indicated that it would then address
the self-incrimination challenge and consider what remedy would be necessiry if a Fifth
Amendment violation was found.
I
I

71

Common themes and relevant policies

I

That governments need identification and activity information to enforce ckiminal and
civil regulatory requirements is a self-evident truism. Acquiring such infdrmation by
imposing compelled self-reportingobligations is, of course, a quick and efficient method
to fulfil this need. However, as at least some legal precedents
silence and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination may limit
the state to rely on mandatory self-reporting to provide regulatory data.
that limitation is related to the nature of the setting in which self-reporting
scope of the official inquiry, and the extent of the government's use of
submitted in response to the compelled reporting requirement.
I
"Harlan J., who provided the fifth vote for upholding the validity of the statu$ against the
self-incrimination challenge, found that the circumstances presented a real risk of testimonial
incrimination. Byers, fn.22 above, pp.438439 (Harlan J., dissenting). His opinion, !instead, was
premised on his assessment of the history and purposes of the self-incrimination p+vilege along
with an evaluation of the nature and significance of the other competing public interests involved
in the statute: ibid., p.449. Evaluated against this background, Harlan J. found thht the state's
regulatory scheme for motor vehicle accidents, including the application of crimidal sanctions,
did not offend the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege. A contrary concksion, in his
judgment, would have threatened "the capacity of the government to respond to sbcietal needs
with a realistic mixture of criminal sanctions and other regulatory devices": ibid., p.452.
36 There was a separate Fourth Amendment search and seizure challenge to the dtatute which
the Court also rejected. Hiibel, fn.23 above, pp.2457-2460.
I
37 ibid., p.2461.
38 ibid.
I
39 ibid.

1
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Ever though there are substantial differences between national legal systems, there is
also widespread consensus on the importance of respecting both the right to silence and
the pr$ilege against self-incrimination, as well as general agreement on the importance
of thelvalues these doctrines serve. As expressed by the ECtHR in Murray v United
Kingd~:
I

"qlthough not specifically mentioned in Article 6 . . . of the Convention, there can be
nq doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege
against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which
lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 . . . By providing
thf accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these
i~munitiescontribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims
of Article 6."40
1n~ u n d ve France:' the Court had earlier pointed to the fact that the principle had already
been adopted by the European Court ofJusticeas part of the law of the ~ u r o ~ e a n
Nevert eless, such general statements do not reveal whether specific self-reporting
schemes are consistent with the right to be free of compelled self-incrimination. That
task retuires a more precise assessment of each reporting system and its impact.
At oee extreme the state could structure its compelled self-reporting procedure
to require that criminal suspects give truthful and complete answers to all relevant
questions posed by criminal investigators, despite the self-incriminatory potential of
their responses. However, this would strike at the heart of the self-incrimination
principle and would therefore be the most difficult reporting system to justify. The
most that could be said in support of such a requirement is that it would further the
societal interest in the investigation of criminal offences, particularly where they are of
a serious nature. But in reviewing homicide prosecutions arising out of the activities of
the Irish Republican Army, the ECtHR rejected the argument that such "security and
public concerns" were sufficientto supplant the right to silence.43Not surprisingly, the
claim that self-incriminationinfringements were necessary in the investigation of less
serious crimes has also been rejected by the
Separatelyit is difficult to conceive of a self-reportingrequirement that is incorporated
as part of a criminal regulatory scheme being effective in producing useful information.
To the contrary, it is more likely that the subject of the investigation would not truthfully
respond to mandatory questioning, if he in fact chose to respond at all. Instead, the
most likely result of such a system is to create an extra penalty for perjury or silence

!'

40

41

Fn.2 above, at [45].
(19;93)16 E.H.R.R. 297 at [42].

42 Orkem SA (formerly CDF Chimie SA) v Europenn Commission 119891E.C.R. 3283. That opinion
included an extended review of the status of the self-incrimination privilege in various European
jurisdictions: ibid., at [99]-[110].
43 Heaney and McGuinness, fn.10 above, at [58]. The Court reached the same conclusion in
another IRA homicide case, Quinn v Ireland (App.No.36887/97),judgment of December 21,2001,

at [59].
44 Funke, fn.41 above, at [44] (interest in the enforcement of customs laws) and Saunders, fn.3
above, at [74] (interest in the investigation of corporate fraud).
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that could be added to the punishment for the underlying offence or imposed in lieu of
such punishment if the authorities were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to sustain
a conviction. This is hardly a worthwhile justification for a mandatory1 self-reporting
obligation when weighed against the principle barring compelled self-incrimination.
Short of requiring the suspect to respond to the criminal investigator's questions, a
self-identification obligation, perhaps coupled with a tax or fee, could Be imposed on
individuals engaged in categories of criminal activity. American legislation requiring
the registration of gamblers, gun owners, and members of Communist; organisations
are illustrative of this approach. The registrant would not necessaril) be required
to provide details of his activities, but the fact remains that the merk filing. of the
registration document and payment of any tax imposed would alert thd authorities to
the individual's illegal conduct. Beyond that, compliance with the reporti& requirement
might itself warrant an inference of illegal activity if the prosecutor is allo&ed to produce
the report in court and identify the defendant as the individual who subhitted it.
Although a statute imposing a registration and tax obligation on illegal1activities does
not have to include a broad inquiry into the details of those activities, it still strikes at
the core of the interests protected by the right to silence and
Instead of furthering a true regulatory objective, a system
of past and potential criminal activity is itself part of the
serve the purpose of alerting authorities to illegal activity and would acweve that goal
by compelling individuals to incriminate themselves if they chose to komply. If the
societal interest in crime control is not sufficient to outweigh the inditidual interest
in freedom from compelled self-incrimination when criminal investigators are asking
direct questions about the commission of a crime, the same balancing ortcome should
occur when the state is demanding the registration of individuals planning or engaged
in criminal activities.
Arguably, criminally-oriented registration requirements could be
a use immunity limitation. The state would then have the
would be prohibited from taking evidentiary advantage
subsequent criminal prosecution. However, if such
in the criminal prosecution of those engaged in the
immunity restriction would severely undercut the
requirement. Moreover, it is not clear that use
protection for the interests furthered by the
might prevent evidentiary use of the report
but it would still leave the authorities
report. Unless the immunity
the information compelled from the suspect, it could not provide adeqdtate protection
for those forced into self-incrimination by the mandatory reporting requirement.
Because of these considerations, the principle against compelled
should have the effect of invalidating reporting requirements whose
individuals planning or engaged in criminal activities. The
such obligations present are direct, and they are
that are likely to be secondary along with a
best. The conclusion of the ECtHR in Heaney and McGuinness that a stitute requiring
that suspects account for their movements and actions "in effect destioyed the very
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essence of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent"P5 is
equally ;applicableto criminally-oriented registration statutes and should produce the
same rebult. This would also be consistent with the US Supreme Court's invalidation on
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds of registration statutes that are focused
on any "highly selective group, inherently suspect of criminal a~tivities".~~
A slightly different issue is raised where the government seeks an individual's identity
in a criminal investigation as part of an otherwise legitimate encounter, rather than
imposing a self-identification requirement as part of a criminally-oriented regulatory
reporting system. If the encounter is not otherwise illegal, the authorities are not learning
anything new as a result of the compelled self-identification other than the name of
the individual. In contrast, where self-identification is required as part of a criminallyoriented regulatory system, the state will learn of the individual's involvement in the
illegal activity from the report he files, a fact not likely to be previously known.
The nature of the analysis is illustrated by the reporting systems reviewed by the
ECtHR in Weh and the US Supreme Court in Hiibel, both of which fall somewhat short
of generating the same direct self-incrimination challenges as are present in mandatory
criminal registration statutes. In Weh and Hiibel, reporting requirements were imposed
on individuals because of circumstances that brought them to the attention of the police.
The authorities were aware of their existence when the information demand was made,
and neither the Austrian requirement that the owner identify the driver of his vehicle
nor the Nevada statute requiring that an individual who has been lawfully stopped
identify himself had the effect of bringing an otherwise unknown individual to the
attention of the police.
It was also true that neither the Austrian nor the Nevada reporting statute was
limited in its application to individuals who would risk incrimination by giving a
truthful response, nor could the likelihood of those responses being self-incriminatory
be calculated. Under the circumstances, it is understandable that both the ECtHR and
the US Supreme Court refused to find the reporting systems at issue facially invalid.
However, neither court ruled on the legitimacy of an individualised self-incrimination
claim as a defence to a prosecution for failing to self-identify. That result was possible
because in neither case had the defendant claimed that a truthful response to the
identification demand would have been self-incriminatory.
Ultimately, however, where responding to the reporting demand in a criminal
investigation would mean providing the state with evidence that could be used
to secure a criminal conviction, the self-incrimination issue cannot be avoided. The
argument could be made that since the principle against compelled self-incrimination
under the ECHR is not absolute, the importance of the criminal investigation and the
narrowness of the inquiry might well be deemed sufficient to counterbalanceindividual
right to silence concerns. Thus far, however, the ECtHR has resisted allowing societal
justifications to outweigh the self-incrimination principle when the intrusion involves
a direct demand for self-incriminatory information in a criminal in~estigation.~~
In
light of this background, any generalised claim that reporting demands associated with
45 Fn.10 above, at

46 Byers,
47

[55].

fn.22 above, p.430, citing Marchetti, fn.29 above, p.47 and Albertson, fn.31 above, p.79.

See Heaney and McGuinness, fn.10 above and Quinn, fn.43 above.
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criminal investigations further substantial public interests that are sufficient to override
the right to silence would be difficult to sustain. Instead, each regulatory self-reporting
obligation must be carefully assessed for its centrality to the regulatory system, the
scope of the obligation it imposes, and the ability of the state to obtain the information
in other ways, before a judgment can be made as to whether the interest$ furthered by
the self-reporting requirement are of greater weight than the right to redist compelled
self-incrimination.
Where a disclosure obligation is incorporated in reporting requiredents that are
part of a legitimate non-criminal regulatory scheme, the balance betweeh societal and
self-incrimination interests becomes more difficult. Reporting obligation$ are a critical
component of the regulatory process, providing regulators with essentidl information
while at the same time allowing the state to avoid employing more intrusive and
expensive methods to achieve the same purpose. Such obligations are (not aimed at
criminal activities and normally do not raise self-incrimination concerns. As long as
they remain entirely outside of the criminaljustice process, no recognised right to silence
or privilege against self-incrimination issue can be raised.
In contrast, if information submitted for legitimate regulatory purposes is subject to
later use in a criminal prosecution against the individual who supplied thd information,
the self-incrimination interests of the defendant are directly affected. Uegal systems
have the choice of resolving the conflict by either allowing full use of the compelled
information in both regulatory and criminal settings, enforcing the regulatory reporting
requirement with a restriction barring the use of the compelled infordation in any
criminal prosecution, or invalidating the reporting requirement entirely because of its
potential self-incriminatory consequences.
To date, support for invalidating self-identification reporting requirements included
I
in non-criminal regulatory systems has been limited to dissenting opinions.
The
approach they take is to adopt a broad view of the possibility of self-incriminationarising
out of the compelled production even though no specific claim of self-tncrimination
is made.48 The majority opinions, in contrast, look for an individualiised claim of
self-incrimination, and then judge whether to enforce it despite the legi imacy of the
regulatory system of which the self-reporting requirement is a part. The rivy Council
judgment in Brown v Stott and the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R.& White adopt
1
this approach, although each reaches a different conclusion.
In Stott, the opinion of Lord Bingham upholding the Scottish reporting! requirement
emphasised the substantial public interest in dealing with the misuse of vehicles on the
roadways balanced against the limited intrusion on the suspect's interesds reflected in
the single question asked of her, and the moderate and non-custodial pen Ity provided
by the statute for refusing to respond. From Lord Bingham's perspective, despite the
intrusion on the right to silence, the fairness of the overall proceedings was not impaired.
What this analysis does not recognise, however, is that even if the intrusion js limited to a
single question, it nevertheless attacks the "essence" of the right to silence find principle
I

d

4
I

I

''Welt, fn.4 above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Lorenzen, Levits and ~ a ~ i ~ e vata[2;]
t,
Reig, fn.7 above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Hajiyevat and Jebens, at [dl; Hiibel, fn.23
above, pp.2461-2464 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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against sblf-in~rimination.~~
It represents the use of compulsion to obtain incriminatory
information from a suspect, regardless of the setting in which the information demand
is made. phis attacks the core of the principle against compelled self-incrimination, and
regulatory systems imposing such requirements should not be evaluated by applying a
balancing process that lacks defined standards and is open to almost any interpretation.
This does not mean that the reporting obligation itself is invalidated. The selfincrimination problem only arises if the state seeks to use the contents of the report for
both reghlatory and criminal purposes. This is reflective of the approach employed by
the ECtHR in Saunders v United Kingdom where it expressed disapproval of the use of
the fruitg of a compelled interrogation while accepting the legitimacy of an underlying
regulatory system that obligated Saunders to respond to questions posed to him by
regulatory official^.^'
The Canadian Supreme Court in White adopted the same solution when confronted
with a system compelling the reporting of accidents. It upheld the validity of the
reporting requirement, but a grant of immunity made the contents of the report
unusable in any criminal prosecution. The accident reporting system at issue may have
had its home in the regulation of motor vehicles, but the Court did not consider the
possibility of applying criminal sanctions to be remote.
Separately, it would be problematic to attempt to justify a balancing process that
treated the public interest in avoiding car accidents as more substantial than the
argument rejected in Heaney and McGiiinness that IRA terrorism warranted overriding
the principle against self-incrimination. Regulatory systems further important public
health and safety interests, but measuring them against criminal statutes that protect
individuals from personal violence and property loss is inherently subjective. That the
self-reporting obligation called for by the regulatory system is itself a limited one does
not serve to alter the fact that the core of the right to silence is breached whenever
state compulsion is used directly to compel self-incrimination for use in a criminal
prosecution.
This does not mean that every type of self-report will necessarily violate the principle
against compelled self-incrimination. If all that is sought is basic identification data,
as in Vasileva before the ECtHR and Hiibel before the US Supreme Court, or where a
truthful response does not present an appreciable risk of self-incrimination, the claim
of infringement of the right to be free of compelled self-incrimination is likely to be
denied. Unless the real focus of the regulatory system is to compel self-incriminatory
information from those who are likely to be engaged in criminal activities, facial attacks
on the reporting requirement based on the principle against compelled self-incrimination
should be rejected.
~ d m i t t i n gto being the driver of a car when the vehicle was believed to have been
involved in a traffic violation, as in Weh, however, is another matter. The ECtHR was
not faced in Weh with a refusal to respond based upon the principle against compelled

49 In Heaney and McGzrinness, fn.10 above, at [51], the Court rejected the argument that an
infringement of the right to be free of compelled self-incrimination could be justified because of
the presence of protections against abuse. The Court noted that the protections could not prevent
impairment of the "essence" of the self-incriminationright at issue.
50 Saunders, fn.3 above, at [67].
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self-incrimination, nor did the US Supreme Court face such a claim in Hiibel. Where the
facts support the assertion of the right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination,
however, there is no principled way to avoid the conclusion that the self-incrimination
claim must be respected.
Both the right to silence and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination relieve
individuals of the obligation to provide the state with evidence that will be used to
convict them of a criminal offence. Where the risk that the compelled reporting obligation
will have that effect is present, courts should accept the legitimacy of the decision not to
respond unless a guarantee against use of the information in any subsequent criminal
proceeding can be given. It is true that this may not be the most efficient,procedure
for the collection of information since it limits the usability of whatever ,is learned.
Nevertheless, the accommodation of a widely accepted human right requires this result.
I
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